1. 11 years later: Experimental evidence on scaling up education reforms in Kenya (TL;DR gov’t didn’t adopt well)
(This paper was published in Journal of Public Econ 11 years after the project started and 5 years after the first submission!) “New teachers offered a fixed-term contract by an international NGO significantly raised student test scores, while teachers offered identical contracts by the Kenyan government produced zero impact. Observable differences in teacher characteristics explain little of this gap. Instead, data suggests that bureaucratic and political opposition to the contract reform led to implementation delays and a differential interpretation of identical contract terms. Additionally, contract features that produced larger learning gains in both the NGO and government treatment arms were not adopted by the government outside of the experimental sample.”
- Total causal effect (TCE) = weighted average of the intent to treat effect (ITT) and the spillover effect on the non-treated (SNT)
- Importance: “RCTs that fail to account for spillovers can produce biased estimates of intention-to-treat effects, while finding meaningful treatment effects but failing to observe deleterious spillovers can lead to misconstrued policy conclusions. Therefore, reporting the TCE is as important as the ITT, if not more important in many cases: if the program caused a bunch of people to escape poverty while others to fall into it, leaving the overall poverty rate unchanged (TCE=0), you’d have to argue much harder to convince your audience that your program is a success because the ITT is large and positive.”
- Context: Zeitlin and McIntosh recent paper comparing cash and a USAID health + nutrition program in Rwanda. From their blog post: “In our own work the point estimates on village-level impacts are consistent with negative spillovers of the large transfer on some outcomes (they are also consistent with Gikuriro’s village-level health and nutrition trainings having improved health knowledge in the overall population). Cash may look less good as one thinks of welfare impacts on a more broadly defined population. Donors weighing cash-vs-kind decisions will need to decide how much weight to put on non-targeted populations, and to consider the accumulated evidence on external consequences.”
3. Why don’t people work less when you give them cash?
Excellent post by authors of new paper on VoxDev, listing many different mechanisms and also looks at how this changes by type of transfer (e.g. gov’t conditional and unconditional, remittances, etc.)
BONUS: More gender equality = greater differences in preferences on values like altruism, patience or trust (ft. interesting map)